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Falling in love outwards: Eco-social work and the sensuous event 
Abstract 
Summary: Social work is a discipline that focuses on the person-in-the-environment. 
However, the social domains of influence have traditionally received more attention from the 
profession compared with the impact of the natural world on human well-being. With the 
development of ecological theories, and growing threats to the environment, this gap has 
been addressed and now the notion of eco-social work is attracting more interest. This article 
builds on this corpus of work by exploring, and augmenting, the thinking of the philosopher, 
David Abram, and his phenomenological investigation of perception, meaning, embodiment, 
language and Indigenous experience. The implications for eco-social work are then 
addressed. 
Findings: The development of Abram’s philosophical thesis is charted by reviewing his 
presentation of the ideas of the European phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. It is argued that Abram uses phenomenology to explore the character of 
perception and the sensual foundations of language which, in Indigenous cultures, are 
connected with the natural world. A gap in Abram’s thinking is then revealed showing the 
need to set human perception and language within an understanding of power. Overall, this 
re-worked thesis is underpinned by a meta-narrative in which ecology engages with 
philosophy, psychology and Indigenous experience. 
Applications: By grounding such ideas in Slavoj Žižek’s construct of the sensuous event, 
three applications within social work are evinced, namely: (i) reflecting on the sensuous event 
in social work education; (ii) rekindling the sensuous event with Indigenous Peoples; and (iii) 
instigating the sensuous event with non-Indigenous populations.  
Key words: Eco-social work, philosophy, Indigenous experience 
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Introduction 
It is axiomatic that we depend on the natural environment to sustain life. Yet, the catastrophic 
events at Chernobyl (and elsewhere) remind us that human beings have the capacity to 
change their surroundings irreparably. Even though many techno-centric interventions yield 
short-term benefits, they also precipitate long-term, deleterious outcomes, including acid rain, 
an escalating carbon footprint, an indubitable green-house effect, global warming, 
environmental degradation, deforestation, interminable flooding, anomic urbanization, bio-
decline (rather than biodiversity), transnational corporate hegemony, drought, and worsening 
inequalities. Should this instrumental approach to nature continue unabated, one could be 
forgiven for conjecturing that the earth’s ecosystem is lurching towards a calamitous, 
apocalyptic end – not unlike that depicted so graphically in Cormac McCarthy’s dystopian 
novel, The Road.  
 
What role should social work play in helping the victims of these tumultuous social and 
environmental changes and their negative impact on inner meaning? Moreover, how can it 
contribute to ecologically vibrant experiences or events that enrich emotional, social and 
spiritual well-being? This article attempts to build on a growing corpus of work addressing 
these vital questions. Such thinking constitutes a paradigm shift that attempts to explore the 
nature of eco-social work in the modern, globalised world.  
 
In making this contribution, the authors embrace a phenomenological analysis of experience 
and meaning.  This type of inquiry reveals the multiplicity of world views, including those 
evinced by Indigenous peoples. Furthermore, it deals with the language of poetry, metaphor, 
myth, symbolism, allegory, chimera, and archetype: the lexicon of the transpersonal. It is the 
‘ground’ of our ‘being-in-the-world’. As the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1962) 
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surmised, it is only through the idiom of poetic language that we get glimpses of ‘being’ in its 
truest sense. This turn towards phenomenology is vital if we are to deepen our understanding 
of ecological events and their implications for social work.  
 
In this article, we appropriate the phenomenological ideas of David Abram (1997) in his 
evocative, poetic, mesmeric work, The Spell of the Sensuous. In this text, Abram creatively 
fuses European phenomenology, environmentalism and indigenousness to evince a rich meta-
theory linking perception with ecology. Using this conceptual alignment, Abram attempts to 
determine the nature of deep experience, perceptions of reality and how they are enlivened by 
culture. Although a few social work commentators (Besthorn, 2003; Coates, 2003; Gray et 
al., 2008; Gray & Coates, 2011) have made tacit references to, or drawn on some of the ideas 
underpinning The Spell of the Sensuous, a comprehensive exegesis of the text (from the 
academy) has yet to take place.  
 
Having explored Abram’s core ideas, we then consider what they mean for eco-social work. 
However, by way of context and to set the scene, it is important to explore, firstly, the 
conceptual antecedents to eco-social work. It is necessary to review this context as a new 
paradigm of thinking about the natural world is emerging in social work scholarship: one that 
is eclectic, syncretic, radical, transgressive, and interdisciplinary. 
 
The Development of Eco-social work 
Attempts within social work to understand the inter-connection between the ‘person’ and the 
‘environment’, and to apply it to practice, have remained a challenge for the academy. Early 
on, systems theorists (for example, Pincus & Minahan, 1973) having been inspired by 
Parsons’ (1951) seminal, structural-functionalist theory, and von Bertalanffy’s (1968) 
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generalist model of systems integration, focused on the need for holism in social work. That 
is, the person as a system was indelibly linked to wider social and environmental spheres. It 
followed that social workers should acquire relevant psychological and sociological 
knowledge to work effectively with individuals, families, social groups, and organizations. 
However, although enhancing practitioners’ awareness of the social domain (and thus 
countering the intra-psychic myopia concomitant with a narrow psychodynamic approach), 
systems theory was highly abstract and therefore somewhat detached from the real, social and 
natural worlds.  
 
Responding to this gap, later developments within this genre took an ecological turn. One 
prominent example was Germain and Gitterman’s ‘life-model’ approach (1980). Here, the 
ecological focus was helpfully extended to an appreciation of the life-course, stress, resources 
at the individual’s disposal, the impact of power, the influence of natural habitat, and 
temporal and spatial considerations. Other iterations of ecological thinking in social work 
subsequently began to flower. One prominent example was Meyer’s (1983) eco-systems 
perspective which claimed to be more flexible than the life-model approach because it drew 
on a range of explanatory theories. Here, aspects of general systems theory and ecological 
precepts were synthesized into a unifying conceptual framework. According to Meyer, 
systems were labile and came together in a dynamic, transactional way giving rise to multi-
layered cause and effect outcomes in the environment that defied simplistic, reductionist 
explanations. In making this meta-theoretical case, though, the perspective did not give 
enough attention to social diversity.  
 
Such concerns were ameliorated, in part, by Matthies et al.’s (2001) eco-social approach. The 
ideas presented resembled a kind of grounded, eco-criticality: one highlighting how systemic 
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interaction gave rise to various socio-economic and environmental contradictions and 
asymmetrical power relations. Another example of this move was eco-feminism (Gaard, 
2010). Here, attention was given to the suppression of women’s concerns for the social and 
natural worlds, how gender sometimes impacted on relationship in a misogynist way, and 
how female dispositions of caring, nurturing, cooperating, and reciprocating were essential to 
building more sustainable environments. 
 
Yet, in spite of these progressive developments, ‘one of the persistent criticisms of social 
work’s conventional ecological systems perspectives has been their rather narrow 
interpretation of the environmental construct’ (Besthorn, 2013, p. 176). Simply put, an 
inordinate focus had been placed on the social spheres occluding a fuller understanding of the 
bio-physical environment. This might be explained, in part, by the presence of a Manichaean, 
ontological dualism in Western thinking. This separates out the psycho-social and material 
realms viewing them as discrete and distinct rather than having contiguous, porous, 
boundaries that meld in co-dependency.  
 
Coates (2003, 2005) has responded to this gap arguing that not only will the environmental 
devastation of the natural world impact deleteriously on ecological sustainability but also on 
people’s psycho-social well-being. He made a clarion call for a paradigm shift to overturn 
this lacuna based on integration, the sanctity of the natural order, the importance of diversity, 
and community action – one which was inclusive, holistic, supportive of environmental 
sustainability, and spiritually-oriented. Besthorn (2002) also entered the debate at a 
paradigmatic level challenging Western conceptualizations of individualized, self-identity 
and positing a radicalized form of self in its place, one irrevocably embedded in nature.  
Elsewhere, Besthorn (2011) extrapolated the notion of ‘deep ecology’ to environmental social 
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work. His thoughts connected with those of Abram’s because they both contended deep 
ecology was primordial. For the, the concept connoted humanity’s essential connectedness 
with nature. 
 
A raft of thinkers (early, mid-term and late) have engaged with this new direction in 
theorizing an environmentally conscious, eco-social work (for example, Hoff & McNutt, 
1994; Ungar, 2002; Hawkins, 2010; Dominelli, 2012). Importantly, some contributions have 
been pitched at the axiological level of values and principles. Thus, Peeters (2012) argued 
that there was a normative concurrence between the values of sustainability (for example, the 
satisfaction of human needs) and social work (for instance, the promotion of human well-
being). A value-consensus of this kind could be mutually reinforcing and provide the basis 
for alignments with social movements, building social capital and empowerment. Peeters was 
right to start with essential value positions as actions often flow from core beliefs. If we start 
from the ontological premise that the world is inexorably interconnected, we will understand 
that damaging the ‘other’ and the material world, means damaging ourselves. Inflicting harm 
on anything, whether human, animal or material, is like throwing a hot coal: in the process I 
burn myself.  
 
Gray and Coates (2012) have also entered the debate at an axiological level. Searching for a 
moral stance, they articulated a new framework for environmental ethics based on Besthorn’s 
notion of deep ecology (referred to earlier), eco-feminist ideas, the need for pragmatism, and, 
finally, the place of social constructionism which saw the environment through a cultural 
lens. These ethics were complemented by Miller et al.’s (2011) approach which promulgated 
different aspects of environmental justice as a core axiom grounding them in legal and policy 
directives that protected the environment and Indigenous cultures. 
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 To conclude this section, if the old paradigm of ecological social work has been found 
wanting and a new one is beginning to take shape, as viewed through conceptual and 
axiological lenses, then an ontological perspective on environmental social work may well be 
timely and complementary. Abram’s thesis provides one illuminative departure into this 
territory. 
 
The Spell of the Sensuous 
David Abram is a philosopher, ecologist, and performance artist. In his lyrical, landmark, 
text, The Spell of the Sensuous, he sought to articulate some of the fundamental reasons why 
the human mind had largely disconnected from the ‘more-than-human-world’, how it had lost 
a primordial, sensual awareness of animals, plants and the material realm. His aim, in all of 
this, was to re-orient our perceptions and sensual understanding of nature and wider ecology, 
so that we would viscerally ‘fall in love outwards’, in order to mitigate environmental decline 
and disaster. This objective was also about re-capturing the dismissed, yet arcane, wisdom of 
various Indigenous Peoples (the endangered and vanishing ones), whose perceptual 
alignment, reciprocity, and linguistic engagement with their environments created a deep 
respect for all things not human. Crucially, according to Abram, the Indigenous mindset 
viewed the natural order as an animate sphere, one that was living, breathing, and suffused 
with meaning. The well-being of the human psyche, it was contended, depended irrevocably 
on imbibing the sentience of nature rather than commodifying it rapaciously for material 
gain. 
 
In order to take this project forward, Abram turned to the work of two founding thinkers 
within the discipline of phenomenology: Edmund Husserl (1962) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 7 
(1996). Phenomenology was concerned with the way in which the world made itself evident 
to human awareness or consciousness, the manner in which ‘things first arose in our direct, 
sensorial experience’ (Abram, 1997, p. 35). It derived from the study of direct, 
(inter)subjective, lived experience of the surrounding phenomenal world. It was so-called 
because it treated everything as phenomena. In his early work, Husserl saw this as an entirely 
subjective experience – the experiencing self or subject being the centre of study such that we 
could arrive at the ‘pure consciousness’ as it posited and pondered various phenomena.  
 
However, Husserl’s emphasis on getting to the nub of pre-conceptual, sensory experience 
was contested as it was seen as solipsistic, that is, conveying the notion that the self was the 
only reality that could be proved. If subjective reality were a solitary experience existing only 
in the mind of the solipsistic individual, or subject, how were we to know anything objective 
about it? How were we to recognise the sensual reality of other experiencing selves? To deal 
with this criticism, argued Abram, Husserl (in his later work) developed the idea of ‘multiple 
subjectivities’ in the field of ‘appearances’. Hence, the phenomenal field was a collective 
landscape, a veritable ‘lifeworld’, constituted by other experiencing subjects as well as one-
self. On the one hand, there remained my experiences, my imagination, and my dreams while, 
on the other, shared common experiences, which Husserl called intersubjective phenomena, 
that is, phenomena experienced by a multiplicity of sensing subjects who, nevertheless, each 
experienced them subjectively. Through inter-subjectivity, the world was apprehended as an 
interlacing matrix of shared meaning, sensation and perception.  
 
The primacy of intersubjective experience, in shaping meaning, was also extolled by Mead 
when he developed his theory of symbolic interaction in social life (Mead, 1967). For Mead, 
actors continually perspective-take. That is, they put themselves in the position of others to 
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anticipate their responses and, on the basis of this reflection, mould their behavior 
accordingly. More than that, they consider what is appropriate social behavior by taking on 
the perspective of a generalized other. In this way, they connect with what they see as societal 
expectations about the roles they need to perform within social groups. Interestingly, Weigert 
(1997, p. 16) builds on these Meadian precepts by introducing the neologism of the 
‘Generalized Environment Other’: 
 
‘Just as social interactionists note that individuals think of themselves…in terms 
of a generalized other…so, too, I argue that in an ecological age we are learning 
to think of meaning in terms of the anticipated responses of the environment as a 
generalized natural other’.  
 
By adopting this inter-subjectivist stance, Husserl and Mead challenged Descartes’ separation 
of mind from the surrounding material world. This notion had led proponents of Western 
science to observe, in a detached manner, (what was considered to be) a separate, 
determinate, measurable world: one that could be quantified and later commodified when the 
forces of modernization, urbanisation, and industrialization took hold. Thus, the 
‘disinterested’ sciences had overlooked the subject’s commonplace, taken-for-granted 
perceptions of the world around her. Contra this move, Abram suggested (in a Husserlian 
moment) that the world was an ‘open and dynamic landscape subject to its own moods and 
metamorphoses’ (p. 32) – a landscape that people engaged with sensuously.  
 
Yet, the idea of a fully immersed, embedded subject in the natural world remained under-
theorized in Husserl’s unfolding development of phenomenological philosophy. What was 
needed was a more refined, radicalized notion of the participatory nature of perception. 
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According to Abram, Merleau-Ponty rose to this challenge. For him, our identity as human 
beings was expressed though our embodiment. We were physical objects, first and foremost, 
each with a unique location in space and time. Merleau-Ponty was interested in the world of 
direct, immediate sensual perception, which preceded knowledge. So, central to his 
philosophy was the identification of ‘the subject’ – the experiencing ‘self’ – with the bodily 
organism.  
 
Critically, for Abram, Merleau-Ponty saw the human ‘body-subject’ (the elemental power of 
the flesh) as an active, open form, continually improvising in its relations to the world, 
ceaselessly adjusting itself to a shifting terrain. It was not a genetically programmed machine. 
If it were, it could never come into genuine contact with anything outside itself, never 
perceive anything new and never be genuinely startled or surprised. While we might have 
some predispositions or ‘instructions’, the whole of our experience, and the exact time and 
place in which it took place, could never be predetermined. Through our receptivity and 
creativity we opened ourselves up to the world, like the bud of the flower unravelling to 
reveal its beauty, through the process of perception. This often happened outside of our 
verbal awareness giving rise to the centrality of pre-conceptual, pre-theoretical, and pre-
linguistic experience.  
 
Through the act of perception, we engaged with the world, time and space, seeing some 
things, overlooking others. In short, perception was the conduit between the person and the 
world, a mutual intercourse between the body and its outer environment. It was in the bodily, 
sensory experiencing of the world that we established and felt a sense of reciprocity or 
mutuality and reverential connection with all that existed. This is a notion easily 
understandable to a photographer or any aesthete. Objects invite you into their world. They 
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attract or repel you. Beautiful objects can possess you and you mourn the loss of them. You 
feel empty without them. Here, perception is more than visually seeing: it is also hearing, 
touching, feeling, smelling, and tasting. In grounded experience, these senses merge into one 
overarching sense impression - an experience known as synaesthesia. For Abram, this was an 
integrated aesthetic experience common to many Indigenous Peoples.  
 
Abram then built on these foundational, phenomenological precepts, by turning to an 
examination of language or, in his vernacular, ‘the landscape of language’. Simply put, 
language flowed from sensuous experience and perception. Essentially, we did not learn 
language conceptually but instead corporeally. More significantly, for Merleau-Ponty and 
Abram, language was primarily expressive of sensory experience with one’s environment and 
thus much more than a system of abstract signs with accompanying syntactic rules. 
Utterances, and the meaning they conveyed, were ingrained in physical gestures concerning 
the impact of the world around us. Echoing the calls and cries of the earth, Indigenous, oral 
cultures embodied this elemental use of language, potentiating the person’s sensuous life. 
 
However, in the modern world, argued Abram, both our language and sensuous life became 
disconnected from the world. Language, subjectivity, and perception no longer reflected our 
reciprocity with nature but instead conceptualized it as inert and mechanical. As Westerners, 
we were raised in cultures which asked us to mistrust our immediate sensory experience and 
to orient ourselves linguistically to an abstract, objective reality known primarily through 
quantitative measurement, technological instrumentation, and other exclusively human 
involvements. For Abram, this turn of events was one of the primary causal factors giving 
rise to the current ecological crisis. His explanation for why this occurred centred on how 
early phonetic writing had developed. Antediluvian, ancestral paintings, it was claimed, 
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constituted a primitive form of pictorial writing. Notably, they reflected a participatory use of 
perception to represent animals and the natural world.  
 
However, with the advent of the Hebrew and Greek alphabets, a fissure opened up, distancing 
human subjectivity from nature. Instead of focusing on pictorial representations of non-
human entities, the alphabet directed our attention to abstract vowels and consonants. 
Whereas pictorial symbols in Indigenous cultures conveyed a symbolic, representational 
meaning of animals, plants, and geological landscapes, the evolving alphabets reduced 
meaning to signature phonetic characters devoid of any sensuous connection with organic life 
or the phenomenal world. Such an occurrence was compounded by the forgetting of ‘air’. For 
Indigenous Peoples, ‘air’ was a sacred, omnipresent medium that suffused and enriched all of 
nature and being. It connected people to their environment. Without ‘air’, we would be 
unable to exist, think, and crucially, speak. According to Abram, the ancient Hebrews used 
the ‘air’ when expelling their breath, to intone sacred words for the numinous. It was 
therefore elemental to creation and the corporeal world. As humans forgot the connection 
between breath, air, and speech, they internalized human awareness and lost their link with 
the sensory world as directly experienced.  
 
So, to recap, Abram had sought to answer why human beings had become dislocated from the 
animate earth in order to explain the ecological crisis facing the world today. His thesis 
emphasized the development of perception, language, and writing: how they lost their 
sensuous moorings in the natural environment. Fundamentally, for Abram, to be fully human 
meant that we must be in right alignment with the world. In making this radical claim, Abram 
acknowledged that he was not seeking to offer a total theory for environmental decline. 
Instead, he addressed the problem from a particular philosophical perspective. Other 
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explanations could have focused, inter alia, on the development of agriculture, the industrial 
revolution, the appropriation of instrumental rationality or explored the world’s ever-
expanding, inter-country trade. All of these factors have had a formative bearing on the health 
of the environment. 
 
For us, though, the disregard of power is a major omission in Abram’s thesis, fecund as it is. 
Clearly, different expressions of the inner world of perception must be analysed in terms of 
the power relations they embody (Bourdieu, 1977). Thus, while we fully support the vital 
utilization of phenomenology (and its outpouring in language), as a key lens for viewing the 
ecological crisis, it is clear that both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty neglected to explicitly 
theorize how power shaped human perception, inter-subjectivity, and the ‘lifeworld’ 
(Habermas, 1971); nor did they consider how power framed meaning in relation to the natural 
environment. There is merit in the argument that our ancestors were sensuously linked to the 
more-than-human world (in a way in which both were enriched), but it is also the case that 
human interests, over time (for example, relating to gender, race, class, religion, and 
nationalism), have profoundly shaped the nature of human subjectivity and how people 
interacted within their ‘lifeworlds’ (Habermas, 1971). Dominant groups utilize power to 
realize their interests and, in doing so, often suppress, supplant or exclude subaltern ones, 
including the Indigenous populations to whom Abram refers. Importantly, this insight is only 
beginning to be explored fully by the systems and ecological theories in social work that were 
described earlier (Payne, 2014).  
 
On a wider plane, perception and language in the modern world have been indelibly shaped 
by power-saturated ideologies and discourses emanating from the domains of the state, 
culture, and politico-economy. One need look no further than the current neoliberal world 
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order where mass consumerism moulds the person’s intentionality and thinking dispositions 
inexorably: a mental colonization operating globally (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2000). This is 
reflected in the way people quite often talk the language of the market economy and popular 
culture in an habitual and one-dimensional way (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Marcuse, 2002). 
In this context, certain types of language reflect an instrumentalist mindset, which social 
actors adopt to maximize personal gains through the most expedient means possible 
(Habermas, 1987). One notable effect of this mindset has been the plundering of the Earth 
and its natural resources (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002).  
 
That said, bringing an awareness of power to the fore in no way contradicts Abram’s thesis 
but rather enriches it. Other social theorists have augmented phenomenology by drawing on 
an understanding of power. For instance, Dorothy Smith blended a Marxist, feminist 
understanding of power with phenomenology in her theorization of institutional ethnography 
(2005). To restate the argument: perception and language are central to human experience 
and are therefore cardinal to the question of ecological threat and decline. That much is 
unassailable. Nonetheless, they do not occur in a neutral vacuum. Power is omnipresent, 
circulating in every transaction and all possible spheres of social life, not always as negative 
and constraining, but often enabling (Foucault, 1980). We are now in a position to return to 
the subject of eco-social work with this enhanced understanding of the connection between 
perception, language, power, and the natural order. 
 
Implications for Social Work 
Under this section, we will explore the implications of the foregoing thesis for social work. 
This analysis is encapsulated under the following sub-headings, namely: (i) reflecting on the 
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sensuous event in social work education; (ii) rekindling the sensuous event with Indigenous 
Peoples; and (iii) instigating the sensuous event with non-Indigenous populations. As can be 
seen, the notion of the ‘event’ is the axial principle around which the various strands of this 
inquiry revolve. It was the Slovenian social theorist, Slavoj Žižek (2014), who recently gave 
it a renewed salience, philosophically speaking. But what does Žižek mean by an ‘event’ and 
why is it worthy of examination in this context?  
 
For Žižek, an event is synonymous with an occurrence which has intense meaning for the 
social actors involved. It can be a poignant experience on the existential plane: falling in love, 
leaving home for the first time, or living through bereavement. Or, it can occur on a grander 
scale: being caught up in a seismic, socio-political incident that has historical significance for 
the actors concerned. Events depicting the colonial exploitation of Indigenous Peoples come 
to mind here. Clearly, this type of event may be embroiled in power relations, struggle, and 
contestation. Alternatively, an event can have an aesthetic or epiphanic resonance: being 
captivated, for instance, by a climactic resolution of discordant themes in a classical 
symphony.  
 
Critically, what happens next, post-event, is a profound re-ordering of our phenomenological 
understanding of ourselves, others and, ostensibly, the world. More than that, events engage 
our senses in a profound manner. When falling in love, we inherently want to touch the other. 
Aesthetic rapture invariably involves sight and hearing and perhaps synaesthesia. So, events 
are often miraculous, sensuous happenings that fundamentally alter our inner consciousness 
and perception. For Žižek, they lead to ‘the surprising emergence of something new which 
undermines every stable scheme’ (p. 6). Moreover, an event is not only an incident which 
happens in time and space but also something which brings about a change in the perceptual 
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frames through which we make sense of the world. As a consequence, we gain perspicuity – a 
deeper understanding of reality, cutting through fantasy, illusion, and the ideological fog of 
false consciousness.  
 
In this process, frames of meaning, and the language describing them, become enlarged. 
Consequently, events have the capacity to challenge, subvert or undermine previous, taken-
for-granted frames of understanding. In doing so, they thrust our attention below the 
meniscus of everyday perception to deeper insights about experience: a movement from 
‘surface’ to ‘depth’. At this juncture, we can extrapolate Žižek’s notion of the ‘event’ to the 
eco-social context and thereby introduce the idea of a sensuous event. To elaborate further, a 
person can experience a sensuous event that opens up perception to the enveloping earth and 
to the forgotten air. Interestingly, Abram describes many such personal events in his book 
when he journeyed throughout East Asia. Or, more negatively, she can undergo an encounter 
with an urban landscape replete with broken glass, litter, and human detritus. Rather than the 
spell of the sensuous, these ‘wasteland’ events might be rendered as the violation of the 
sensuous.  
 
When considering experiences of this sort, Žižek draws on Heidegger’s (1962) philosophy. In 
the latter’s later work, certain events were catastrophic. What Heidegger was alluding to here, 
primarily, was the interminable exploitation and destruction of the natural world through 
scientism and technology ‒ all at the expense of our being-in-the-world. Mirroring 
Heidegger’s concern, Žižek said, ‘the possibility of total self-destruction was just a 
consequence of our relating to nature as a collection of objects of technological exploitation’ 
(p. 32). The synergy with Abram’s thesis must become evident at this point as certain kinds 
of ‘event’ (linked to experience in the environment) can invoke phenomenological reflection, 
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whether for good or bad. But can this notion of a sensuous event, supported by Abram’s 
ideas, have important ramifications for social work? 
 
Reflecting on the sensuous event in social work education 
Given the preceding arguments, it is important in social work education to enable students to 
reflect on their past experience of sensuous events in the natural environment, whether 
involving service users or not, contrasting positive and negative examples. Such events might 
emerge from the student’s early life when on holiday with parents in distant lands or when 
living in urban jungles in early adulthood. The aim of such reflection is to appreciate, at a 
deep experiential level, the impact of our natural surroundings on our mood, perceptions, 
senses, use of language, and general well-being – taking into account Abram’s core thesis on 
the spell of the sensuous world. More specifically, students need to consider how these events 
affected their embodied responses at the time. Experiencing the dawn while on holiday might 
have precipitated bodily stillness, fixation and a heightened, sensory awareness. As a result, 
our frames of understanding might have changed. Compare this rapturous feeling with the 
lugubrious, inner perceptions that eventuate when entering, for the first time, a run-down, 
criminogenic environment where the quality of the air is poor; the body, in reacting to this 
type of event, wheezes and splutters, steeling itself against injury or human assault.  
 
Writing about these events, comparing good with bad, discussing them with other students 
and tutors, noting changes in the essence of perception, meaning, sight, hearing, and 
embodied response ‒ is concomitant with the deep phenomenological inquiry advocated by 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Abram. Throughout this process of inquiry, students should be 
encouraged to pay attention to their use of language, how these events are described, how 
words capture intrinsic frames of meaning. It is to also consider how relations and 
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asymmetries of power have shaped physical environments and our perceptions of them, 
whether this is through an analysis of top-down local government policy or industrial decline.  
 
Of further importance is the reflection on how the natural world affects social integration and 
the events that mark them. Those witnessing the early dawn together might subsequently feel 
a greater interconnectedness, while those entering a neglected housing estate could well 
experience alienation and atomization. Such reflection and learning is meant to augment the 
theorization of social systems covered earlier in this paper. Moreover, this type of inquiry 
suggests that dominant rational-behaviourist approaches and evidence-based practice be 
tempered with a lived-experience understanding of the world. Constructivist interpretations 
of worlds moulded and shaped by languages, cultures, environments, and power-laden 
worldviews best fit this phenomenological view of the world. Armed with this understanding, 
social work students are better able to show deep empathy for service users and how the 
social and environmental systems surrounding them impact on their well-being. 
 
The kind of post-hoc, experiential reflection, described above, may need to be augmented, 
however, by facilitating a student’s direct contemporaneous exposure to the natural 
environment. Evidently, some social workers may have had limited experience with this 
domain having been brought up in urban landscapes. In appropriate cases, Indigenous 
Peoples could be involved with social work educators in planning and orchestrating such 
events whether as part of the traditional college block or practice placement. Involving 
Indigenous Peoples as partners in social work education parallels a move to involve non-
Indigenous service users in designing, delivering and evaluating the social work curriculum 
(Duffy, 2006). It further militates against the ‘false clarity’ (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 52) 
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promulgated by some higher education institutions where a didactic pedagogical approach 
occludes experiential learning and real life ‘felt’ experience. 
 
Rekindling the sensuous event with Indigenous Peoples 
According to Gray et al. (2008), before social workers can begin to practice Indigenous social 
work, they must avoid misplaced attempts to apply dominant Eurocentric and Anglo-
American, universalist paradigms of social work knowledge and skills to the problems faced 
by Indigenous Peoples. Instead, social workers need to practice in a way that is culturally 
sensitive, recognizing the uniqueness of Indigenous cultures whether in North America, 
Australia, China, Malaysia, India, or New Zealand. This is to collaborate with Indigenous 
Peoples, advocate for them, and work in a manner which promotes self-directed change, self-
representation, and self-determination. We contend that social workers will better apprehend 
this paradigm shift once they have experienced, for themselves, the spell of the sensuous. The 
reflection outlined in the preceding section on social work education marks an important 
event in this phenomenological shift. 
 
In line with this orientation, a central plank of Indigenous social work is a deep appreciation 
of the spiritual significance of the land for Indigenous Peoples. Another way of putting this is 
to say, ‘place constitutes life in the highest ontological sense’ (Gray et al., 2008, p. 52). As 
highlighted above, Abram’s work reinforces this axiom. With this in mind, we contend social 
workers should support attempts by Indigenous Peoples to rekindle events which enable them 
to reconnect with the sacred land, the air, and mysterious sense of inter-being whether 
through the practice of shamanism or other rituals. It is vital here to tune into the fact that 
natural events generate meanings and perceptions that are captured ineluctably in oral 
cultures, metaphorical stories, and embodied actions.  
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 Crucially, though, social workers need to show an accurate empathy for the loss of place, the 
loss of meaningful events within the natural world, the loss of the ‘sensuous’ itself. This loss 
could be categorized a form of gross, symbolic violence and is often perpetuated by power-
laden events in which actors have sequestered the land, or manipulated it according to the 
needs of various interest groups. Indigenous Peoples need to be given the space to talk 
through the effects of these misanthropic events. To respond appropriately to such accounts, 
social workers require cultural competence and sensitivity underpinned by a respectful 
appreciation of a non-western world view. More than that, they must advocate for the 
restoration of stolen lands, the upholding of land treaties, and the implementation of human 
rights. Such advocacy results in politicized events: meeting with officials and other social 
development organizations. In all of this, ‘eco-social work draws on a deep ecological 
awareness of our relationship with nature and makes us acutely aware of the importance of 
protecting and sustaining the natural environment in everyone’s interests’ (Gray et al., 2008, 
p. 258). 
 
Instigating the sensuous event with non-Indigenous Peoples 
When referring to ‘non-Indigenous’ peoples, we have in mind mostly urban populations who 
have little or no historical connections with the natural world, land, and environment. They 
form the populations to whom a western social worker will invariably visit in order to 
provide helping or protective services. It is indubitable that many such ‘service users’ will 
have minimal deep experience with natural phenomena nor been afforded the opportunity to 
reflect on them, as part of the social work intervention. Given this gap, we argue that social 
workers should augment their systemic interventions by affording service users the 
opportunity to experience enriching ecological events within the natural world. Abram refers 
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to this as a process of reinhabitation. Here, people are encouraged to ‘apprentice themselves 
to their particular places, to the ecological regions they inhabit’ (p. 271) or can have contact 
with through transport.  
 
There are many ways in which reinhabitation can be structured. For instance, young people, 
deemed to be ‘troubled and troublesome’, might benefit from organized hill-walking in a 
nearby national park. The sheer physical, embodied exertion means that the rarefied air is no 
longer taken-for-granted. While ascending up to the summit of the highest viewpoint, the 
young people see, for the first time, a bird of prey hovering in the fields below. In a parallel 
moment, the din of their housing estates recedes to a faint memory as they hear the chattering 
of a nearby stream. Perhaps a pre-conceptual adumbration of a primordial solitude enters 
their consciousness for the first time.  In a different location, a group of adults with mental 
health difficulties are encouraged and supported to restore a damaged habitat. Working 
collectively, they campaign to shut down a local factory known to pollute a nearby estuary. 
Their aim is to see the salmon return: a sensuous event in its own right. The act of 
campaigning is empowering. 
 
 In another part of the city, a group of older people in residential care are encouraged to paint 
or photograph local scenes of natural beauty (pastoral, bucolic, aquatic, sylvan) when the 
spring has just commenced. Later on, during the summer, they touch the earth when planting 
seeds as part of a local horticultural event. Experiences of the seasons, different changes of 
light and sound, moving in the environment and being mindful of the embodied sensations, 
enriches the older people’s lives. This is akin to what the theosophist, Rudolph Steiner, 
referred to as Gnostic sensationalism: the ability to experience, through the senses, the 
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deepest truths of nature. It is a perspective adopted with people with a learning disability in 
many Steiner therapeutic communities throughout the world.      
 
Social workers can support, resource, enable, and collaborate in the co-production of such 
events. They can also advocate and negotiate to improve urban environments, where 
pollution, waste, and decrepit housing militate against the spell of the sensuous. Importantly, 
social work must recognize the close imbrication between the social and natural orders. What 
occurs in one invariably affects the other. This is also to be aware of the omnipresence of 
power, not only in shaping human perception, but also in creating the fabric of different 
environments. Thus, in tackling ‘limiting’ power, eco-social work aligns itself with, and 
draws upon, anti-oppressive, critical, political, rights-based, and structural social work. In this 
connection, Dominelli (2012) argues cogently that ‘green’ social work can utilize 
environmental disasters to highlight structural inequalities, the misrecognition of local 
identities and the oppression of marginalized populations. This is a movement from 
environmental crises to environmental justice. 
 
Dominelli’s reference to environmental disasters is salutary and chimes with Klein’s (2007) 
contention that such crisis events are used by neo-liberal power elites to opportunistically 
force through their economic policies of deregulation, the free market and State retrenchment. 
Klein used the example of Hurricane Katrina to support her argument. In the aftermath of the 
disaster, the State introduced a widespread reform of secondary school education, essentially 
privatizing what had hitherto been a mainly State-funded and organized form of educational 
provision. The ‘shock’ of the crisis event opened up a window for change that could be 
strategically manipulated given the presumption that oppositional forces would be at their 
weakest point. As a result of such changes, inequalities in educational opportunity began to 
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emerge, and the poorest members of the community began to suffer. According to Klein, 
profiteering replaced public service.  
 
Given this insight, social workers need to be consciously aware of how neo-liberal doctrines, 
causing cleavages in income and well-being, can be forced through following cataclysmic 
environmental events. Attempts to ‘shock’, ‘storm’ and ‘norm’ new and, ostensibly 
hegemonic, fiscal policies can be countered expeditiously through what McDonald (2009) 
views as the three hallmarks of critical social work practice, namely: (i) critical analysis – 
attempting to theoretically understand the dynamics of the neo-liberal accumulation and 
acquisitive system and its impact on the environment and human subjects; (ii) critical 
reflexivity –apprehending how power shapes identity and leads to status subordination, 
misrecognition and injustice; and (iii) critical politics - galvanizing collective action to lobby 
and advocate for those most affected by environmental disaster.  
 
Social workers, in embracing the afore-mentioned principles, must work to develop solidarity 
and subsidiarity amongst and between oppressed groups moving beyond individualistic 
approaches and promoting methods such as self-directed groupwork (Mullender and Ward, 
1991) where service users are encouraged to take action for empowerment. Even though the 
neo-liberal context places stringent controls of accountability and governance on social 
workers, they can still find spaces and gaps to break out of mainstream bureaucratic practices, 
and creatively explore opportunities for activism (Smith, 2007). 
 
Conclusion 
In the modern world, civilization has lost its way, has turned in on itself, cut itself off from 
the breathing earth. Yet, indigenous narratives remind us of the indelible and insuperable 
 23 
reciprocity between nature and human beings: an ‘earthly reality that is a single seamless 
system of interacting dynamics and ever-forming and reforming parts’ Weigert (1997, p. 15). 
This truism forms the crux of eco-social work, a growing perspective within the field. We 
have argued in this paper that eco-social work can be enriched by Abram’s phenomenological 
approach to the natural world but only when set within an appreciation of power. The 
emphasis Abram gives to perception, meaning, sensation, embodiment, and Indigenous 
experience, through the works of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others, provides an impetus to 
fall in love outwards, in order to heal not only human consciousness but also the animate 
earth.  
 
In addition, we have used Zizek’s notion of the ‘event’ as a conceptual stepping stone to link 
Abram’s philosophical premises with eco-social work. In doing so, we have arrived at three 
fundamental applications pertaining to social work education, social work with Indigenous 
Peoples and, lastly, social work with non-Indigenous populations. This reinvigorated sense of 
eco-social work amplifies the vital message that social work theory and practice can no 
longer afford to concentrate only on the person-in-the-social-environment. The reciprocal 
imbrication between nature and ourselves should be placed centre-stage in the profession’s 
understanding of what it means to practice social work in a range of environments. Yet, for 
this message to truly take hold, social workers must experience the spell of the sensuous for 
themselves. This is to experience, firsthand, the release of sentience from the inner 
psychological world and its reconnection with the natural terrain that surrounds us.  
 
To conclude, we contend that the tripartite approach to sensuous events, that we have 
explicated, can be developed further through empirical investigation. Hence, a 
phenomenological research study might explore the deep meaning of such events for social 
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work students; it could examine how social work educators orchestrate such events 
particularly if they engage Indigenous Peoples as educational collaborators; it could ascertain 
how non-Indigenous populations value social work interventions aimed at enhancing their 
awareness of the natural environment; and, finally, it might explore the constraints and 
opportunities impacting on social workers when they attempt to embrace a  critical 
phenomenological-ecological approach. 
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